SECTION THIRTY-SEVEN     

             If the upädhis are considered empirical realities and not illusory, still Brahman, being beyond the scope of any divisions, cannot become divided or limited by the upädhis. Besides, Brahman, being devoid of attributes, all-pervading, and undivided, can cast no reflections. Since It is has no attributes It can have no relation with upädhis; being all-pervading, It cannot be divided into object and Its reflections; and, being undivided, It cannot be seen. The sky, not possessing any visible attributes, has no reflections. What is seen are the reflections of the limited luminous bodies in the sky.

ÇRÉ JÉVA TOÑAËÉ COMMENTARY

                       In monism existence (sattä) is explained at three different levels--prätibhäsika (apparent reality), vyävahärika (empirical reality), and pärmärthika (Absolute Reality). The apparent reality is that which is perceived under certain abnormal conditions, but which ceases to exist under normal or empirical conditions. One may, for example, mistake a rope for a snake in semi-darkness, but this perception ceases as soon as light is shed on the rope. Therefore, the snake perceived in the rope was an apparent reality, or prätibhäsika sattä. It cannot be considered an empirical reality.

            The empirical reality, or vyävahärika sattä, refers to our perception in daily life under the normal wakeful state. The ultimate reality, or pärmärthika sattä, exists in all the objects of the material world as one uniform existence. In Dåg-dåçya-viveka (20) Çrépäda Çaìkaräcärya writes: 

"Every object in the material world has five characteristics--existence, ability to be perceived, attractiveness, form, and name. Of these the first three belong to Brahman and the others to the world." The last two items, form and name, being products of Mäyä, constitute only the empirical reality; they do not exist on the Absolute level. They are necessary only as long as one has not realized Brahman. The other three are Brahman as perceived in empirical reality.

            The pärmärthika sattä, or Absolute Reality, is impersonal Brahman,  which, unlike the other two realities, cannot be contradicted by any experience or scriptural injunction. Just as dreams do not exist when one is awake, the material world will cease to exist when one becomes Brahman realized. Being absolute, there is no higher state above Brahman which can deny the existence of Brahman in the past, present, or future. At the Brahman level there is no distinction between knowledge, the knower, and the object of knowledge. All three fuse into the one Absolute Reality. The two lower realities, prätibhäsika and vyävahärika, are not perceived at this level.

            Çréla Jéva Gosvämé refutes both the paricchedaväda and the pratibimbaväda, by considering the upädhis as a feature of the two lower realities, because the upädhis can never be part of the Absolute Reality, as that would introduce duality on the non-dual plane. In the case of paricchedaväda, or the theory of seperation, upädhis can be either empirical reality (anävidyaka) or apparent reality (ävidyaka). Çréla Jéva Gosvämé considers both and shows the fallacy in them.

            If the upädhis are empirically real, still Brahman, being beyond any empirical reality, cannot be limited by them. In the Bhagaväd-gétä (13.13) Lord Çré Kåñëa confirms this when He says:

"I shall now explain the knowable, knowing which you will taste the eternal. Brahman, the spirit, beginningless, and subordinate to Me, lies beyond the cause and effect of this material world."  Thus no upädhis can limit Brahman.

            But in the opinion of Çaìkaräcärya, this verse says, "I shall tell you that which has to be known, knowing which one attains immortality; it is the beginningless, supreme Brahman, which is said to be neither being nor non-being". In commenting on this verse Çaìkara writes:

idam tu jïeyam aténdriyatvena çabdaika-pramäëagamyatvat na ghaöadiväd ubhaybuddhyanu-gata pratyayaviñayam iti ato na sat na asad it ucyate. yat tu uktam viruddham ucyate jïyeyam tad na sat tad na asad ucyate iti. na viruddham. "anyadeva tadviditadatho aviditadadhi" (Kena Up. 1.3) iti çrute.

"But this knowable Brahman, being beyond the reach of the senses, can be understood only through revealed knowledge. Therefore, unlike the clay pot etc., it can never be said to exist or not exist, thus it can never be called sat or asat.

            Objection: But you said it is to be known--then how can it not be sat or asat? This seems contradictory.

            Answer: No, it is not, because Çruti states: "That (Brahman) is surely different from the known; and again, it is above the unknown"."

            So according to the Mäyävädis own version, Brahman is beyond sense perception, beyond empirical existence and non-existence. This being the case, the upädhis, if they are empirically real, can never limit the undivided and indivisible Brahman and produce jévas, hence the Vedas say, agåhyo na gåhyate "Brahman is untouchable". (Båhad A. #.9.26) Brahman is neither pierceable nor breakable and therefore cannot be broken or limited into jévas the way one may break a big stone into pieces.

            But, even if it is granted that Brahman can be divided into jévas by upädhis, then neither the jéva nor Brahman can be called eternal. But in the Bhagavat-gétä, which the Mäyävädis accept as authority, both jéva and Brahman are described as eternal. In Chapter Thirteen, text twenty, the lord says the jéva is "anädi", beginningless. The same is explained in verses 20 to 24 in the Second Chapter of Bhagaväd-gétä.

            Çréla Baladeva Vidyäbhüñaëa says that even if the above point is overlooked other inconsistencies abound in the Mäyäväda conception: The jéva and Éçvara move from one place to another, but Brahman is all-pervading. Somehow a portion of Brahman becomes limited by upädhi to manifest as jéva. When the said jéva moves from one place to another, either Brahman also moves along with it or Brahman does not. But Brahman moving from place to place is not possible, because moving means leaving an earlier place of existence and going to a new place where it did not exist previously. But this is absurd, Brahman being all-pervading.

            If Brahman does not move, we must assume the alternative--that while the jéva is moving from place to place, the upädhi keeps limiting a new portion of Brahman and releasing the previously limited portion from upädhi. This reduces Brahman, or Absolute Reality, to a virtual toy in the hands of the upädhi, which is absurd.

            If it is then assumed that all of Brahman is grasped by the upädhi, then the problem of movement can be solved; but then there is no Brahman free from the upädhi, hence no need for the liberation of the jéva nor any need for discussion of philosophy, because all of existence would consist of the deluded Brahman and there would be no liberated domain to aspire for.

            If it is countered that Brahman is not the basis for the upädhis and thus they can move independent of Brahman, this means that even at the liberated level the upädhis will not cease to exist, being of an independent nature.

            The conclusion is that in paricchedaväda, belief in the upädhis being empirically real is invalid.

            Çréla Jéva Gosvämé then refutes the pratibimbaväda, the theory of reflection. Brahman, he says, can have no reflection in the upädhis, or subtle bodies, because it is devoid of all attributes. Only an object which possesses attributes like form and color can have a reflection. If the object is invisible, then how can it be reflected in anything?

            If it is countered that the sky, although invisible,  reflects in water. Jéva Gosvämé says that it is in fact the celestial bodies and not the sky, which reflects in the water. If the sky can cast a reflection then the wind must cast one also, because air is a grosser manifestation of the material elements than the sky.  According to modern science the bluish background seen behind the celestial bodies is an optical illusion created by the reflacted sunlight as it passes through the atmosphere. No concrete object called sky is there to cast a reflection. Hence the analogy comparing Brahman to the sky being reflected in water is invalid.

            Further, it was already shown that Brahman is beyond empirical existence and non-existence and beyond sensory perception. Subsequently, it is foolish to speculate now that Brahman reflects as jévas. Still, Çréla Jéva Gosvämé gives the opposition a breather and accepts their premise that Brahman can reflect in upädhis, in which case Brahman, being all-pervading, must also exists in the upädhis in which it is supposed to reflect. But if the object, Brahman, is already existing in the medium where it is supposed to cast a reflection, how will it reflect there? A mirror cannot reflect in itself, similarly Brahman cannot reflect in itself. And even if it reflects somehow, how will it be possible to distinguish the reflected Brahman from the original Brahman already present? There will be an overlapping of the two, and even if a distinction is made, what is the basis for such distinction? Why is it that the reflected Brahman will be singled out, termed as jéva and made to suffer?  What is His offense?  Why is it that the reflected Brahman becomes affected by the upädhi and not the original Brahman, although the reflection is just overlapping it?

            Further, it is known that Brahman has no parts in it, niñkalaà niñkriyaà çäntaà (Svet. 6.79), "Brahman has no limbs or parts in it; It is devoid of any activity and is peaceful". A formless, indivisible object cannot have a relation with any upädhi, real or imaginary. It cannot reflect in any medium.

            To counter this the monists say that when a red flower is kept next to a crystal, the crystal appears red. Here the red color, which is formless and partless, has cast its reflection in the crystal, thus it its possible for Brahman to reflect. This is a faulty argument. The red color belongs to the flower and that flower is reflecting in the crystal, although in the crystal we see only the color of the flower. The color exists as an attribute of the flower; it cannot sustain itself independently of the flower. Further, a flower has shape and contains parts and attributes. In the end neither the color nor the flower is comparable to Brahman. As with the reflected sky comparison, this is a dissimilar example.

             Moreover, Çruti says, asaìgo hyayam puruñaù (Båh.Är.U.4.3.15), "Brahman is free from any relation or association". Thus Brahman cannot strike any relation with the reflecting medium. But the Mäyävädis interpret the word "asaìgaù" to mean " devoid of real relation". This means Brahman can have non-real relations or associations, created by Mäyä; but we have already argued that Brahman has no qualification to have a reflection or any other relation with an empirically real medium, what to speak of a non-real relation or medium. The Praçnopaniñad (4.10) confirms this when it states, tadacchäyamaçaréramalohitam, "That Brahman casts no shadow, has no body, and is colorless". The conclusion is that whether accepted as real or unreal, the upädhis can never impose themselves on Brahman. They only affect the deluded jéva.

   In the next section, Çréla Jéva Gosvämé, accepting the upädhis as real, gives more arguments against the Mäyäväda doctrine.