SECTION  THIRTY-NINE

            On the other hand, if the upädhi is considered an apparent reality, then the jéva and Éçvara, who come into existence due to the limitation (paricchedaväda) or reflection (pratibimbaväda) of Brahman are also unreal or non-existent, since such limitation or reflection is impossible. Then their doctrine, which they base on the analogy of an unreal dream state, will not be supported by the pot and the sky example, involving real adjuncts, since no analogy can be drawn between possible and impossible things. Therefore, the theories of separation and reflection are nothing but phantasmagoria, because these cannot explain the different states of existences such as the phenomenal world, being themselves illusory.

ÇRÉ JÉVA TOÑAËÉ COMMENTARY

            After showing that empirically real upädhis cannot give a satisfactory explanation for the existence of neither the jéva nor of Éçvara, Çréla Jéva Gosvämé now considers the Çaìkarites second option, that the upädhis are apparent.  In this section the upädhis are called 'ävidyaka', which means illusory and refers specifically to the prätibhäsika (apparent) reality of the Mäyävädis. Illusory in this context does not mean non-existent, for non-existence will never give rise to either the jéva or Éçvara. Rather, illusory means that the upädhis exists neither on the empirical level nor on the Absolute level. These apparent upädhis must cease to exist at both the empirical level and the transcendental. They are an intangible, apparent reality, akin to a dream, misperception, or an hallucination.

            The objects in a dream or in a misperception, such as a rope seen as a snake, are not tangible. One may eat a big feast in a dream, but he does not feel full upon awakening and the feast appears real only while dreaming. This dream reality (prätibhäsika sattä) is inferior to the empirical world and the Absolute realities discussed in the earlier sections yet the Mäyävädis posit that such apparent upädhis can cause Brahman to take on the characteristics of jéva or Éçvara.

            The first step in refuting this misconception is to point out that an effect is always dependent on a cause and that specific causes give specific effects. For example, one cannot make water taste sweet by adding salt. It follows therefore that if the upädhis are apparent realities they cannot give rise to empirical realities. Beyond it being a pleasant reverie no one really cares if in a dream he is crowned emperor of the world. Indeed he may actually suffer by losing some tangible opportunity in the empirical world while wishfully dwelling on the sweet dream. However much he dreams, his apparent reality will never become an empirical one.

            The two analogies the Mäyävädis use to explain paricchedaväda and pratibimbaväda--the sun reflecting in the waterpots or the sky becoming limited by a pot--which Çréla Jéva Gosvämé refuted earlier are inappropriate here as well. Even accepting the Mäyäväda premise that the sky is an empirical reality and therefore it can be limited by upädhis, such as pots, Brahman is non-empirical and indivisible and has no such comparable characteristics. If any limitation is to be reconciled with the definition of Brahman it has to be on the apparent level and not on the empirical level; but such limitation of Brahman, having no empirical reality, would be useless in explaining how the jéva and Éçvara came about on the empirical plane. Hence, in considering either the empirical or the apparent upädhis we are left with no consistent explanation of how Brahman becomes limited to become jéva or Éçvara.

            In an analogy, there must be some similarity between the example and the subject. The more similarities, the stronger the analogy. If there is no similarity, or if there is perfect agreement, the analogy does not serve as an example. In the example of a pot and the sky there is no similarity between Brahman and the sky, and the upädhi, the pot, is empirical, not apparent.

            In the example of the world being like a dream, which the impersonalists offer to prove the illusory nature of the world, although the upädhi, a dream, is only apparent, there is no similarity between the dream world (apparent reality) and the material world (empirical reality). If a person commits murder in a dream he is not hanged for it, but in the phenomenal world he must face prosecution for such an act. So it is illogical to say that the world is illusory like a dream. Sin and piety, which pollute or purify the heart of the doer are not applicable in dreams, but they give their sweet or bitter fruit in the phenomenal world. Hence the example of a dream has no similarity with the material world. The reason the dream analogy is used in the scriptures is only to inspire a sense of detachment for those persons desiring to walk on the path of transcendence.

               The final option for the Mäyävädis is to put Brahman in the same class as the sky, to relegate Brahman to an empirical reality. That leaves us with no Absolute Reality, in which case the whole idea becomes absurd, for logically Absolute Reality must exist and the Vedas and numerous saintly persons confirm this fact.

            Thus all these examples are unsuitable and the doctrines of pariccheda and pratibimba, are good only as mental exercises. They give no logically sound explanation for how Brahman, by adulteration with upädhis, manifest as many, namely as Éçvara and jévas.

            Still more refutations of impersonalism are rendered in the next section.