SECTION FORTY

            In this way, by basing their ideas on Brahman and avidyä alone their philosophy ends up in a contradiction, namely that the one undivided Brahman, of pure consciousness, having no contact with avidyä,  becomes jéva when polluted by contact with avidyä. Moreover, the same Brahman is called Éçvara when considered the basis of Mäyä, which is an imposition of the jéva out of his avidyä. But the same Brahman is called jéva when within the domain of Mäyä, wherein the jéva becomes the subject of Éçvara's Mäyä.

            Furthermore, avidyä is said to exist within pure consciousness (Brahman), to give rise to the jéva, and vidyä in that part which is called Éçvara, possessing a super-imposed upädhi of avidyä. And, the absurdity to beat it all, the one who possesses vidyä is the source of illusion. These and other such unintelligible imaginations should be investigated. >

 ÇRÉ JÉVA TOÑAËÉ COMMENTARY

             In the previous sections Çréla Jéva Gosvämé gave refutations to the two main theories of monism, paricchedaväda and pratibimbaväda. He showed that neither of these theories give a consistent explanation of the empirical world nor of the jéva's presence in it. Now he looks at the internal fallacies in the same theories. He says that even if the division of the Brahman into various jévas is accepted through either the paricchedaväda or the pratibimbaväda, still the contradiction between Brahman and avidyä cannot be resolved.

            How can a portion of Brahman, which is pure consciousness, fall into the domain of Mäyä and think of itself as jéva? Knowledge and delusion cannot have the same basis, just as light and darkness cannot have the same source. Besides, Brahman, being indivisible, permits no such fragmentations as to manifest jévas. Moreover, on the absolute plane no Mäyä or avidyä is present, only Brahman. Either Brahman must degrade itself to the empirical level of Mäyä to be adulterated by upädhis, or Mäyä has to elevate herself to the absolute level to influence Brahman. No possibility of the former exists because Brahman, being devoid of attributes, cannot change itself. The latter option gives rise to dualism, because Mäyä and Brahman would have to stand on a common platform on the Absolute plane. This, of course, runs counter to monism.

            When pressed, the impersonalists may try to console us that somehow or other the jéva is in mäyä and how it happened is not the vital issue. Now the house is on fire and it is not practical to search out Mäyä's origin; rather try to escape the fire before it devours you, meaning before you lose this human form of life.

            But even if we grant that argument, they should at least first convince us that the end they want us to seek is in our interest, which they have failed to do. The house may be on fire, but it does not follow that we should panic and jump out the first available window to our certain death.

            Çréla Jéva Gosvämé says in effect that the Mäyävädis believe that after Brahman comes under the influence of avidyä He is called jéva. Then this jéva creates Mäyä by his imagination. A portion of Brahman then gives shelter to this Mäyä and becomes known as Éçvara, or the Lord. From then onwards Mäyä always follows Éçvara's dictum and then influences the Mäyä covered Brahman, now called jéva. So Éçvara is the basis of Mäyä and jéva is her viñaya or subject.

            This is unintelligble. Their explanation is plagued with the logical defect called "anyo'nyäçraya doña", or the defect of mutual dependence: The existence of Mäyä is due to the jéva and that of the jéva is due to Mäyä. Without Mäyä there is no jéva and without jéva there is no Mäyä. Then a part of Brahman becomes Éçvara by contact with Mäyä, but then Mäyä is subordinate to this Éçvara. Even Éçvara cannot exist without the mercy of the jéva who is further dependent on Mäyä. So ultimately Éçvara is at the mercy of Mäyä.

            Further, they maintain that Mäyä has two facets--vidyä and avidyä. The upädhi limiting Brahman into Éçvara is the vidyä part of Mäyä, which is abundant in the mode of goodness; and the upädhi limiting Brahman into the jéva is the avidyä part of Mäyä. Hence, although Éçvara is the embodiment of knowledge He is the basis of illusion for the jéva, thus simultaneously he becomes the support of illusion and knowledge. These are some of the absurdities resulting from the acceptance of paricchedaväda or pratibimbaväda.

            Çréla Jéva Gosvämé says that other such inconsistencies should be searched out. For example, if originally there is only featureless Brahman and nothing else exists, then where does avidyä come from? And, if avidyä can bind Brahman, it must be more powerful than Brahman. Here Mäyävädis compare Brahman to a spider that weaves its own cobweb and somehow gets bound by it, but this example would make Brahman energetic and a possessor of attributes, which plays them right back into the dualistic understanding.

            Some other points are that Brahman is unlimited and devoid of any limbs or parts so it has no capacity to cast a reflection. Brahman is pure consciousness, but consciousness must have a subject different than itself. There is no meaning to knowledge without a subject. And if there is subject then there is duality of knowledge and known. Ultimately, the very fact that Brahman exists proves that it is potent, because existence of something implies energy or attributes of some sort.

            From Säìkhya philosophy we understand that from Pradhäna comes the Mahat-tattva, which gives rise to false ego. Now even if that false ego is dissolved by practice of knowledge, as the Mäyävädis claim, the other two elements of material nature--mahat-tattva and pradhäna--will remain undissolved. How then will this ego-less jéva transcend the Mahat-tattva and Pradhäna and realize Brahman?

            In Sanskåt there is an inherent relationship between words and their meaning. This meaning can be either an object, quality, a class, or an activity. Certainly the word Brahman represents neither a class nor an activity. If Brahman means a quality, there must be an object possessing that quality, for a quality cannot stand apart from the object. And, if Brahman means an object, then it must possess qualities by its very definition. In either case Brahman becomes an object possessing qualities. In other words, one ends up with dualism.

            Mäyävädis explain this material world on the basis of Mäyä, which is neither sat (real) nor asat (unreal). They say it is inexplicable (anirvacanéya), but in the Bhagavad-gétä (2.16), Lord Çré Kåñëa accepts only two categories, sat and asat: 

"Those who are seers of the truth have concluded that the unreal (asat) has no existence, and the real (sat) has no non-existence." There is no mention here or anywhere else of an inexplicable third level. Thus the Mäyävädis whole concept of Mäyä and the material world belonging to some inexplicable third category is a concoction. 

            To prove their concept of the material world being inexplicable, as not real and not unreal, they give their famous example of the rope and the snake. If the snake is completely false (asat), they say, then man will never perceive it in the rope in the semi-darkness, because a nonexistent object can never be perceived. So the snake is not completely false, but it cannot be considered real (sat) either, because in proper lighting no snake is seen. Thus there must be a third category, seperate and apart from the sat and the asat. This third category is anirvacanéya, inexplicable, which they asign to Mäyä.

            The truth, however, is that one need not resort to the Mäyäväda version to explain the rope seen as a snake. The snake and the rope are both real. The person who mistakes a rope for a snake has previously experienced a real snake either by seeing or hearing and knows it is dangerous. Out of fear of snakes, therefore, when such a person sees a rope, the impression of a snake is super-imposed onto the rope. If someone has never experienced a snake in any manner whatsoever, he will never mistake a rope for a snake. A child, for example, will have no fear of a snake, what to speak of a rope in semi-darkness. Hence there is no inexplicable third category to the material world as the Mäyävädis claim.

            Since they accept only Brahman as the ultimate reality, Mäyävädis say that even  scriptures that teach statements like tat tvam asé are true on the empirical level. Although such utterances are capable of uplifting a person, they are not absolute. This is yet another incoherent aspect of their system. If the scriptures are empirical realities how can they elevate anyone beyond Mäyä? By this logic even the works of such liberated people as Yajïavalkya and Çaìkara are worthless, for not being Absolute in nature, they must be full of dualism.

            In reality, the jéva is not adulterated  Brahman or any similar version as the Mäyävädis may claim. As stated in the Bhagavad-gétä (15.7), mamaiväàço jéva-loke jéva-bhütaù sanätanaù, "The jéva is an eternal fragment of the Lord." This entity can never lose its identity by merging into Brahman. When wheat and rice are mixed they do not merge into each other and become one. We can easily identify the wheat from the rice. If, on the other hand, papaya seeds and blackpeppercorns, which look alike, are mixed together a person may have difficulty identifying them seperately, but this does not mean they are merged and become one.

            When water and milk are mixed together their identities are not lost. Rather, it is our inability to distinguish the two that makes it appear that they are merged. As molecules the milk and water have not merged and become all milk or all water. The proof is that the volume of liquid increases when one is added to the other. Indeed, even when a glass of water is poured into a pail of water they have not merged together. Again the volume of liquid has increased by one glass.

            Similarly, the jéva cannot merge into Brahman and lose its identity, but if a jéva wants to feel himself as one with Brahman and performs the proper spiritual practice for this, then reluctantly the Lord, who is the fulfiller of desires, makes that jéva feel as if he has attained oneness with Him. In reality God and the jéva are always distinct and the Lord always knows this distinction.

            Having established that the Mäyävädi version is opposed to the trance of Vyäsadeva and having highlighted some of the key defects in their logic Çréla Jéva Gosvämé next argues that the monistic conclusion is against the experience of Çukadeva Gosvämé, the prime speaker of Çrémad Bhägavatam.