SECTION FORTY TWO

Therefore scriptural statements that appear to favor such doctrines as paricchedaväda and pratibimbaväda must be taken in a secondary sense. Such statements, to convey knowledge of Brahman, indicate some similarity between the analogy and reality. This is explained in the Vedänta Sütra 3.2.19, "The water in a pond covers the land underneath and thus limits it from the rest of the earth, but Brahman cannot be limited in this way to become a jéva". And in Sütra 3.2.20, "The comparison (in the case of paricchedaväda or pratibimbaväda) is not appropriate in its primary sense but in its secondary sense of participating in increase and decrease, because the purpose of the scripture is achieved by that and thus both comparisons become appropriate." Sütra Nineteen is the opponents objection and sütra twenty is Vyäsadeva's reply.

 

ÇRÉ JÉVA TOÑAËÉ COMMENTARY

             The Mäyävädis accept the Vedas as the supreme authority and cite them profusely in support of their conclusions. Indeed many of the references they use appear to support their theory, but here Çréla Jéva Gosvämé explains the true interpretation of the apparently monistic statements in the Vedas.

            In Sanskåt, words have two kinds of meanings--a primary meaning, called mukhyä våtti, and a secondary meaning, called gauëé våtti. Vedic philosophers say that by the will of the Supreme Lord each word has a potency. This potency gives a specific relationship between the word and its meaning. For example, the word "cow" has a potency in that it refers to a particular object of a form having four legs, a tail, two eyes, a dewlap, and other symptoms. Sometimes, though, in a particular context, the primary meaning of a word does not convey the proper sense. In such cases a viable second meaning must apply and the primary meaning used in a figurative sense. This is so because scriptural statements cannot be meaningless; they are apauruñeya in nature and therefore must be free from defects.

            In the Bhagavad-gétä, for example, Lord Kåñëa addresses Arjuna as puruña-vyäghra, a tiger among men. In it's primary sense, a tiger is a ferocious animal, with claws and fangs. Arjuna was certainly not such an animal, but Lord Kåñëa's words cannot be regarded as meaningless. Hence the need arises for an interpretation. Puruña-vyäghra is a metaphor and the Lord is referring to Arjuna as a tiger only to indicate his courage and prowess as a warrior. The word "tiger" in this phrase applies to these two characteristics that the tiger and Arjuna have in common and not in the primary sense of the tiger's shape and other habits.

            Similarly, the Vedic texts that appear to support the monistic doctrine cannot be abandoned as ambiguous babblings just because their primary meaning contradicts the conclusion of Çréla Vyäsa's trance. Rather, those statements must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the conclusion of the Vedas. Accepting them literally or rejecting them outright will lead to confusion, even to contempt for the apauruñeya çabda. In the opinion of Çréla Jéva Gosvämé, a secondary meaning must be found that agrees with Çréla Vyäsa's experience.

            To support his verdict, Çréla Jéva Gosvämé refers to sütras 3.2.19,20 of the Vedänta. The Vedänta Sütras are divided into four chapters, each having four sections (padas). These are further divided into  propositions (adhikaranas). Each proposition has a thesis, followed by the doubts raised against it, then the antithesis (pürva pakña), then the right conclusion (siddhänta), and finally a reconciliation (saìgati) with other propositions in the chapters.  Some sütras are simply an antithesis that represent the opinions of other sages and philosophers. These are always followed by the siddhänta sütras.

            Sütra eighteen, Chapter Two, third päda, establishes that the purpose behind mentioning the jéva as a refelection of Paramätmä is not to show that Paramätmä becomes the jéva by reflection. The purpose is to show that Paramätmä is different from jéva, just as an object is different from its reflection. If the object and its reflection are non-different they cannot be distinguished from each other. The simile of the sun and its reflection in water is given not to establish oneness, but the opposite. Sütra 3.2.18 states, ataeva copamä süryakädivat, "Therefore, the simile of the sun and its reflection shows the difference between the Supersoul and the Soul."

            A doubt is then raised, that this very simile proves that Paramätmä reflects in avidyä and appears to be jéva. What is the harm in it?

            Then in sütra 3.2.19 this doubt is clarified. It disproves that the jéva is a reflection of Brahman; because Brahman cannot be limited by an upädhi the way water can limit the earth. While explaining this sütra in Govinda-bhäñya, Çréla Baladeva Vidyäbhüñaëa explains that Brahman is all-pervading, hence no object can be at a distance from Him. The sun gets reflected in water because of its distance. In the case of Brahman becoming the jéva this analogy does not hold good because the jéva cannot be a reflection of all-pervading Brahman.

            Although the conclusion of this sütra is acceptable, it does not reconcile those statments of the scriptures that seem to indicate the jéva is a reflection of Brahman. It is in this sense that Çréla Jéva Gosvämé calls this sütra an antithesis. If the jéva is not a reflection of Brahman then what about the çruti statements to that effect? Since the metaphor of the sun reflectd in water is used in the Vedas, it must have a purpose. The saìgati, or reconciliation is given in sütra twenty, which is Vyäsadeva's response. Although the comparison of the sun and its reflection does not hold good primarily, it is valid considering the secondary characteristics of the example: The sun is great like Brahman and its reflection is small, like the jéva. Why do we say so?  Because by this application the conclusion of the sciptures is upheld. Here the secondary meaning fits within the overall framework of the Vedas and its corollary literature. Other valid implications of this example are that Brahman is independent of the pains and pleasures of the jéva in as much as changes in the reflection do not affect the sun. As the reflection is dependent on the sun, so the jévas are dependent on Brahman. Jévas are limited like the reflections while Brahman is all-pervading like the sun, which is seen by everyone from all locations through its heat and light.

            A similar analysis of all the Brahma Sütras, the Vedas, and the Puräëas will show that all the scriptural statements indicating non-difference between God and the living entity, when understood in a secondary sense, are based on some of the common attributes between the example and the subject and fulfill the conclusion of the Vedas. The Vedic texts never propose complete oneness between Brahman and the jéva. Such a proposal would make the whole body of Vedic scripture self-contradictory; it would reduce the Vedas to drivel and study of any Vedic text would be a waste of time. If the objection is raised, instead of rejecting the primary sense of the monistic statements found in çästra, why not accept them and interpret those statements that teach dualism? The answer is that such an understanding would contradict Çré Vyäsa's experience, which is the nucleus for the Çrémad Bhägavatam, the topmost pramäëa.

            Next, Çréla Jéva Gosvämé explains the non-difference between the Lord and the jéva from the vaiñëava point of view.