SECTION FIFTY-TWO 

           But the jïäna, or consciousness, is seen to exist only briefly, taking the form of a blue object one moment and of a yellow object the next. Therefore, how can this jïäna be considered non-dual and eternal as has been established in the Çrémad Bhägavatam? (Objection raised by Kñaëika vijïäna-vädis).

            Süta Gosvämé replies (SB. 12.13.12):           

            The subject matter of the Bhägavatam, non-dual reality, is the essence of all Vedänta.  It is characterized by the unity of Brahman with ätmä, and it's sole purpose is to grant kaivalya, or pure devotion.

            The nature of this Brahman has been described in the çruti: "Brahman is truth, knowledge, and infinite" (Tait. Upaniñad 2.1.1), "By hearing about Him all becomes heard" (Chh.U. 6.1.3), "By knowing Him all knowledge becomes understood". (No reference?) "My boy in the beginning there was only sat" (Chh.U. 6.2.1). Brahman is said to be the only cause of the whole creation in these statements. "He glanced and desired to be many" (Chh.U. 6.2.3).  Here Brahman is explained as one who can achieve anything simply by His will. 

            In the Çruti statement, "Along with the living entity, I shall manifest the name and form" (Chh.U. 6.3.2), the pronoun idam (this) differentiates the living entity from Brahman, but the word ätmä (self) indicates that the living entity is a portion of Brahman. Based on Çréla Vyäsadev's realization in trance, the living entity is one with Brahman, due to the relation of similar quality. Simultaneously, the living entity is distinct from Brahman, who is endowed with internal and external potencies and is the greatest (as shown above). The oneness indicated in such Çruti statements as "Thou art that" (Chh. U. 6.8.7), is based on their common characteristic of being conscious by nature, the jéva being a portion of Brahman. This is the most basic teaching on the path of transcendence.

            This non-dual reality as characterized above is the essence of all the Upaniñads and is the subject of the Çrémad Bhägavatam. In this way, Bhägavatam verse 12.13.12 is related to 1.1.2 quoted in the last section.

             The above idea is clarified with the following example.  Suppose a person was kept inside a dark room from birth and never saw the sun. When he wants to know the sun someone points to a ray of sunlight through the ventilator and says, "That is the sun. Try to realize the sun as a great orb of light, similar in nature to this ray, which is but a portion of the Sun." We will establish in the Paramätmä Sandarbha that the jéva similarly represents a fraction of the Lord, made possible because of His special potency

            Thus the Upaniñads sometimes state that Brahman possesses parts, meaning that He is qualified by these parts, characterized as the jévas; but the Çrutis that speak of Him as without parts are stressing His impersonal aspect, without energies.

            In the fourth leg of the verse (Bhag.12.13.12), kaivalyaika-prayojanam, (quoted in the beginning of this section), the term kaivalya means purity. That this purity is non-different from pure devotion will be demonstrated in the Préti Sandarbha.
 

ÇRÉ JÉVA TOÑAËÉ COMMENTARY

            In the last section Çréla Jéva Gosvämé established that the Absolute Truth is eternal non-dual consciousness. A Buddhist sect, the Kñanika-vijïäna-vädis, raises an objection to this. They say that there is only one reality, consciousness, which is changing at every moment, and no difference exists between knowledge and the object of knowledge. Just as in a dream the objects do not exist outside our consciousness, so in the wakeful state no distinction should be made between knowledge and the object of knowledge. When we see a blue object our consciousness is blue. Then if we see a yellow object the blue consciousness is destroyed and our consciousness changes to yellow.  How then, can consciousness be called eternal?

            The vijïäna-vädis reasoning is that an eternal object cannot be the cause of anything, since it is the cause that transforms into the effect. If, for example,  milk is assumed to be eternal then it can't transform into yogurt. It must remain milk always. Since milk does transform into yogurt, milk is not eternal.  Similarly, the non-dual consciousness, being the cause of everything, must undergo transformation and therefore can't be eternal. Further, all non-eternal things are changing at every moment, although the momentary change may not be noticeable, just as the growth of a plant or our body is not perceived at every moment.

            To the vijïäna-vädis argument Çréla Jéva Gosvämé offers no logical refutation. He answers by quoting Çrémad Bhägavatam, the supreme pramäëa. This Bhägavatam verse explains that the non-dual reality is the jïäna that is characterized by the oneness of the Brahman and the self. Thus oneness does not refer to the one momentary consciousness and its subject as these Buddhists claim. This jïäna is the essence of all the Upaniñads and it is the subject matter of the Çrémad Bhägavatam; it is not momentary but eternal, conscious, and blissful by nature; it is the cause of everything in this universe; and it can achieve everything by mere will. All this implies that this jïäna is endowed with multifarious potencies. It is called Brahman, because it is the greatest and because it can make others great, "Båhattväd båàhaëatväcca yad brahma paramaà viduù" (Viñëu Puräëa 3.3.21). All these characteristics of Brahman are implied by the various Çruti quotations given in this section. So the theory of consciousness of the Kñanika-vijïäna-vädis is neither supported by the Çruti nor by the Çrémad Bhägavatam.

            Their argument is obviously based on considering the Absolute devoid of inconceivable potencies. The Supreme Lord, by His acintya çakti, is the causeof everything and yet remains unaffected; He does not undergo transformation. This is affirmed in the opening verse of the Éçopaniñad:

            " The Personality of Godhead is perfect and complete, and because He is completely perfect, all emanations from Him, such as this phenomenal world, are perfectly equipped as complete wholes. Whatever is produced of the complete whole is also complete in itself. Because He is the complete whole, even though so many complete units emanate from Him, He remains the complete balance."

            The vijïäna-vädis view is due to a material conception of the Absolute, where the energetic cause undergoes transformation. This understanding does not apply to the Absolute realm. In our experience material energy is in a constant state of flux. The Lord and His internal energies, however,  are not under the same system of natural laws that govern material nature.  The example of the spider in the previous section applies here also. To understand the Absolute Truth, one must first shed all his preconcieved notions based on material conditioning and simply hear from authorities in disciplic succession. The Vedic literature reccomends therefore that even if one is highly qualified by good birth, good education and so forth, still he should present himself as ignorant and foolish at the feet of the bonafide spiritual master, enquire from him submissively, and render service to him. This is the process of cleansing the heart and consciousness of material contamination and in time the full realization of the Absolute Truth is revealed to such a sincere candidate. The vijïäna-vädis, being followers of Lord Buddha, reject the Vedas, but as seen from this discussion they end up with a hopelessly muddled  answer to the questions about reality beyond our sensual inspection.

            They say consciousness is momentary.  If this was true then consciousness cannot be the cause of anything, because according to logic a cause has to exist for at least two moments. It must exists for the first moment and then transform in the next moment.  Also, if our consciousness is only existing for one moment we will not remember our past experience, because there would be no continuity from one consciousness to another.  A person who has experienced an activity can recall it later on, but if consciousness is momentary then there is nothing to recall in the next consciousness. This is certainly contrary to everyone's experience.

            Nor can the vijïäna-vädis idea of the external world withstand the test of logic. They say that the external material world is a manifestation of the momentary consciousness. To this the question may be asked whether the external objects are one with the momentary consciousness or different from it? If they say it is different then they agree to our opinion and contradict their own statement that the external objects are a manifestation of the internal consciousness.

            If they answer that the external objects are one with the internal consciousness then there is no way to distinguish between the internal momentary consciousness and the objects perceived by this consciousness. Also, there will be no standard to seperate the blue consciousness from the yellow consciousness and thus there will be rampant confusion in our perceptions.

            According to logic, as well as experience, consciousness has its basis and its subject. If the momentary consciousness itself is the knowledge, then what is supporting it? To this the vijïäna-vädis offer no satisfactory answer. Also, if knowledge of external objects, along with our internal perceptions of happiness and distress, are not different from the self, who is the perceiver, then who is doing the perceiving? It is a common experience that the perceiver, the perceived, and the perception are distinct elements in any determinate knowledge.

            In this anuccheda Çréla Jéva Gosvämé again clarifies that the oneness of the jéva and  Brahman spoken of in Çruti is not indicative of absolute oneness, because of this statement in the Çruti, "Along with this jéva I shall enter as paramätmä and create name and form". Here the jéva is referred to by the pronoun idam (this), indicating that the jéva is different than "I", (the speaker).  Nonetheless, elsewhere the jéva is described as part and parcel of Brahman. This was also concluded from the trance of Çréla Vyäsa. But as discussed before, the mention of oneness of the jéva with Brahman is based on their common characteristic of consciousness. If someone says that Texans and New Yorkers are one, we understand that he means they are from the same country, not that they have no separate existences.

            The jéva is the part and Brahman is the whole. This oneness of Brahman with its parts or energies is the fundamental teaching of Bhägavatam and this is the essence of the Upaniñads. The idea is that the part is always dependent on the whole and is meant to serve the whole. The part, if separated from the whole, has no use, just as a finger lopped off the hand has no utility. In the same way, the relation between the jéva and the Lord, who is called Brahman in upaniñadic language, is that of servant and the served. The jéva has no independent existence. All his problems begin when he starts thinking himself independent of the Lord.

                 Another use of the understanding of oneness between  Brahman and the jéva is that this knowledge is the fundamental step in understanding the nature of Brahman. Besides the jéva there is no other consciousness in the material world. Based on this experience therefore, the jéva is instructed to extrapolate from his experience of self-consciousness to get some idea of the nature of Brahman.

            To explain this, Çréla Jéva Gosvämé gives the example of a man born and bred in a cavelike room and who consequently has never seen the sun. To educate this man about the sun someone points to a ray seeping into his dark room through a tiny opening and tells the man, "This is a single sunray. It's from the sun, which is an enormous sphere consisting of unlimited numbers of such rays." From this the man is able to grasp some idea of what the sun is like. The same method is used to instruct the jéva about the conscious nature of Brahman. Indeed the jéva is like an atomic ray in relation to the sun-like Brahman. The sunray is neither completely different from the sun, because it originates from the sun, nor is it absolutely one with the sun, because it can be seen apart from the sun and because it does not have the same potency as the sun. Similarly, the jéva is neither completely one with Brahman, nor is he completely different from Brahman. In Sarvasaàvädiné, Çréla Jéva Gosvämé calls this relation between the jéva and Brahman acintya-bhedäbheda, "inconceivable, simultaneous oneness and difference". Owing to this relation, Brahman is described as advaya-jïäna or non-dual consciousness, which is the subject of the Çrémad Bhägavatam.

            The word Brahman, as used in the Çrémad Bhägavatam as well as in the Upaniñads, should not be misunderstood to mean impersonal Brahman, as understood by the Mäyävädis. The Mäyävädis insist on such an understanding, but logically impersonal Brahman cannot exist, because to exist would require the attribute of existence, which implies potency, which in turn implies duality--Brahman plus attibutes. But monists abhor duality. Hence in no Vedic literature does the word Brahman have the meaning of impersonal Brahman in the sense that the Mäyävädis intend.

            To clarify this, Süta Gosvämé says, brahmeti paramätmeti bhagavän iti çabdyate, "This non-dual consciousness is called Brahman, Paramätmä, and Bhagavän" (S.B. 1.2.11). Here Süta Gosvämé did not say that the Absolute Truth is also called jéva. He only included these three designations. These are three names of the same non-dual  consciousness, the identity of which the Çrémad Bhägavatam establishes as Kåñëa, the Supreme Personality of Godhead. To the various types of practitioners the same Absolute Truth, appears differently, but the Absolute Truth Itself does not change. This is the significance of the word çabdyate (is worded). The conclusion is that the word Brahman, when used in the Vedic scriptures, is the same as Bhagavän, the Supreme Person, Kåñëa.

            In the Çruti we find two types of instructions, those that indicate jéva as part of Brahman and those that indicate oneness between them, depending upon whether the stress is being laid upon difference (bheda) or non-difference (abheda). Statements in the scripture, such as nityo nityänäà cetanas cetanänäm, that one eternal, conscious being is the support for the plural eternal, conscious beings, belong to the 'bheda' class. Statements such as sarvaà khalu idaà brahma, "Indeed all this is Brahman", belong to the 'abheda' class.     

            The word kaivalya in the Bhägavatam verse 12.13.12 means pure devotion. This is a term the monists commonly use to mean final emancipation or merging into Brahman, but as shown above, the impersonal Brahman of the Mäyävädis is non-existent. Their usage of kaivalya is therefore impossible. Kaivalya means liberation, but pure devotional service is the real standard of liberation, not merging into Brahman. This is explained in the Préti Sandarbha.

            To summarize, the statements about oneness between Brahman and the jéva are for one or more of the following reasons: 

1. To show that consciousness is their common denominator and thus distinguish them from inert matter.

2. To show that the jéva is a fractional part of the Supersoul.

3. To teach that the jéva is dependent on the Supersoul.

4. To indicate that by becoming an unalloyed devotee of the Lord a jéva can become powerful like the Lord.

5. To show that being in the material world is not the natural, healthy condition of the jéva.

6. To show that the jéva, even in conditioned life, has no indepedence from the Lord.

7. To establish that Brahman is the only self-existent reality.

             Thus no statements of oneness between the Lord and the jéva in the Vedic scriptures should be taken as asserting absolute oneness between them. 

            To know the Supersoul, one must first understand the nature of the self. Thus Çréla Jéva Gosvämé begins explaining the characteristics of the self, in the next section.