SECTION FIFTY THREE  

             (In the çruti statement, tat tvamasi), if the conscious and eternal nature of the jéva, implied by the word tvam, is first understood, then the similar nature of Brahman, referred to by tat, is easily comprehensible. Therefore to instruct us about the nature of the jéva, in accordance with the Vedänta Sütra 1.3.20, anyärthaç ca parämärçaù, "the reference to the jéva, dealing with dahar, has a different object". Sage Pippaläyana said to King Nimi (SB.11.3.38):

             The self was never born nor shall it die; it neither increases nor decreases, because it is the witness of all the changes in the material bodies.  Although the life air is one but conceived of as many on account of the various senses, so the eternal, unchanging self, of pure consciousness, though pervading the whole body, is conceived of as many.

            Here ätmä means the pure self. Na jajäna means he was never born. Since he has no birth, he is also free from the change called "existence", which immediately follows  birth. The word naidhate means "he does not increase", thus he is free from the change called transformation. The word hi thus introduces the reason for the above characteristics. The term vyabhicäriëam indicates "of all impermanent things", such as the various states of bodies like boyhood and youth, or the various bodies in the different species of life, such as demigods and human beings. The self is the savanavit, or the witness to the various phases of life. Certainly the observer is not subject to the states of the observed. 

            To the question "What is this unchanging self?" Pippaläyana says upalabdhimätram, "It is consciousness alone". How does it exist? Sarvatra, "It exists in the whole body", and çäsvat, "It exists eternally".

            But how can consciousness be considered eternal, because it is experienced that after the disappearance of consciousness of a blue object, consciousness of a yellow object appears? He answers, Indriyabalena, "Because of the senses". Consciousness is always one, but it appears as many due to the senses. The meaning is that only the different mental states (våttis), that appear and disappear, not consciousness itself.

            Therefore, the first argument is based on the difference between the things that appear and disappear and that which is not subject to such changes. The second argument is on the difference between the observer and the objects observed. The example of the life air (präëo yathä) shows the distinction between the unchanging object situated in the midst of ephemeral objects.

ÇRÉ JÉVA TOÑAËÉ COMMENTARY
 

            The Vedic statements that establish non-difference between the jéva and Brahman do so considering the common attributes of both. One such popular example is tat tvam asi, "Thou art that". In this statement tat signifies Brahman and tvam refers to the jéva. If the spiritual nature of the jéva is understood clearly then the nature of Brahman is easily grasped. This is the idea behind the example in the previous section, where the man in the cave is told to understand the sunray as a sample of the sun.

            This technique of similarity has also been used in Vedänta Sütra (1.3.20), anyärthaç ca parämarçaù, "The reference has a different object."  Çréla Baladeva Vidyäbhüñaëa comments: "This sütra refers to the 'dahar vidyä' portion of the Chändogya Upaniñad (8.1.1), which describes meditation on the supersoul as a small space called dahar, which is within the heart.  The body of the worshiper is considered the city of Brahman, in which lies the Supersoul, the worshipable, dahar. The worshiper is supposed to meditate on the eightfold qualities belonging to the Supersoul. These eight qualities are listed in the Chändogya Upaniñad (8.7.1): The Supersoul is free from sin, old age, death, sorrow, hunger, and thirst. He has unfailing desires and unfailing determination. But further along  ( 8.12.13) is the mention of a blissful one, who rises out of the body and attains to the light and becomes situated in his own real nature. He is called the puruñottama." This puruñottama, according to Baladeva Vidyäbhüñaëa is the jéva that has attained perfection by acquiring transcendental knowledge of the Lord.

            This raises an obvious doubt. Why in the midst of this description of dahar, dealing with meditation on the Supersoul, is there mention of the jéva? Vedänta sütra 1.3.20 gives the answer, anyärthaç ca parämarçaù, "The reference has a different object". The reference is not to convey knowledge about the jéva, but knowledge about the Supersoul, for by knowing the Supersoul the jéva attains his real nature. In the Çrémad Bhägavatam, Pippaläyana Yogendra similarly instructs King Nimi to educate him about the nature of the Lord.

            The purpose of the verse by Pippaläyana is to distinguish the self from the body.  The body undergoes six types of changes. These are listed in the Niruktam (1.1.2),  jayate'sti varddhate, vipariëamate, apakñéyate naçyati ca, "The body takes birth, exists after birth, grows, undergoes transformations by aging, dwindles, and finally dies." The soul however, does not undergo any of these changes. Kåñëa explains this in Chapter Two of Bhagavad-gétä.

            The argument for the soul not undergoing these changes is that it observes all these changes. The observer of a change is not affected by the change or he ceases to be an observer. A man sitting in a moving airplane and unable to look out the window cannot fathom its speed, but a man on the ground observes it easily. Similarly, everyone has the experience of the six types of changes occurring in his own body, but the observer of these changes is not the body. The observer is the soul. This is logically inferred. Hence the very experience "I am miserable" proves that I (the soul) am not miserable, because if I was miserable I would be unable to percieve the misery.

            The objection of the Kñaëika vijïäna-vädis discussed in the previous section, is repeated here and answered differently. The momentary consciousness of which they speak is actually changes in the mental state. It is produced by the senses interacting with the external world. Consciousness itself is constant. Vedänta explains that when a person looks at an object, it creates a  particular mental state, called våtti. This våtti is perceived by the soul. The mental state is not itself the perceiver. The Buddhists, however, lacking all knowledge about the soul, mistake this våtti, which is non-eternal and undergoes changes at every moment, to be the real consciousness.

            The point is further clarified with the example of the life air. Air is one, but air within the body has various names such as präëa, apäna, samäna, and so on according to the function it performs. Similarly, the soul is one, but it manifests consciousness, which, in the body, appears many branched and ever-changing on account of the senses. For example, sweetened cow's milk will give rise to different mental states when perceived with different senses. To the eyes it is white, to the tongue it is sweet, and so on. 

            So it is only the mental state, affected by the varieties of sense perception, that appears and disappears or undergoes changes, not the self. The living entity is a fraction of the Lord and since the Lord is conscious and eternal the living entity must have these qualities as well, in as much as the tiny gold nugget has the qualities of the mother lode. But the purpose of explaining the conscious and eternal quality of the soul with logic and personal experience is to develop an understanding of the Supersoul.

            Çréla Jéva Gosvämé concludes two different types of arguments from the words of Pippaläyana (SB.11.3.38) to distinguish the soul from the material body. The first argument is based on the changes occuring in the material body. We see the changes in the course of time, yet we do not think that we ourselves have changed. We know ourselves to be the same person. Since the attributes of changelessness and transformation cannot be attributed to the same object, the unchanging soul must be distinct from the changing body.

            The second argument is based on the distinction between the perceiver and the perceived. The body and mind cannot be the observer because they are objects of perception. Thus the perceiver, the soul, must be different from them.

            In the next section, Çréla Jéva Gosvämé gives further logic to help distinguish the self from the body.